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[57 C.2d 733; 22 Cal.Rptr. I, 371 P.2d 745J

[Sac. Xo. 7185.

In Bank.

May 22, 1962.]

Estate of CHARLES CHRISTIAN NEILSON, Deceased.
HAZEL DEBOER et aI., Claimants and Appellants, v.
Ii\'ES B. NEILSON, Claimant and Respondent.
[1] Husband and Wife--Community and Separate Property.Profits of Business.-When a husband owns a business as hi'!
separate property and devotes his efforts to the enterprise,
there must be an apportionment of the profits between his
separate property and the community property.
[2] Id.-Community and Separate Property-Profits of Business.
-The usual method of apportionment of the profits of the
business of a husband which he owns and in which he works
is to allocate a fair return on the investment to the separate
property and to allocate any excess to the community property
as arising from his efforts; only when the profits and accruals
actually attributable to the separate property are proved to
differ from the usual interest rate for a well-secured investment is there reason to depart from this system.
[3] Id.-Community and Separate Property-Profits of Business.
- An apportionment of the profits of the business of a husband which he owns as his separate property is required not
only when he conducts a commercial enterprise, but also when
he in,ests separate funds in real estate or securities. The
proceeds and increment in value are apportioned entirely to the
husband's separate estate only when they are attributable
solely to the natural enhancement of the property, or when the
husband expended only minimal effort and the wife introduced
no evidence attributing a value to his services.
[4] Id.-Community and Separate Property-Profits of Business.
-A grain f arme r or nursery operator who conducts his enterprise on separate real property should not be exempted from
the normal apportionment rule, but should be required to account to the community for a portion of the profits. Although
it Illay be difficult to make an npportionment, it is "impossible"
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Community Property, §§ 21, 22; Am.Jur.,
Community Property, § 32.
McK. Dig. References: [1-4] Husbnnd and Wife, § 58; [5, 6]
Husbnnd and Wife, § 93; [7] Husband and Wife, § 132; [8] Husband and Wife, § 59; [9, 10] Husband and Wife, §§ 58, 59; [11,
13-16] Husb~nd and Wife, § 159; [12] Husband and Wife, § 45;
[17] E,idence. ~ :20;;: [18,19] Dec edents' Estates, § 988; [20] Decedents' Estates, § 1121; [21, :26] Decedents' E states, § 993; [22]
Decedents' Estatps, ~ 982; [23] Decec1ents' Estates, ~ 981; [24]
Decedents' Estates, § 980; [2;) J Decedcnts' Estates, §§ 981, 989.
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only in the sense that it cannot be mathematically certain.
(Oven-uling E st(;/ e of Pepper, 1;38 Cal. 619 [112 P. 62, 31
L.R.A. N.S. 1092].)
[5] ld.-Community and Separate Property-lnstructions.-It was
proper to refuse an instruction which erroneously declared
that even though a husband devoted his efforts to farming
operations on his separate property, all of the income and
earnings thercfrom would be his separate property.
[6a., 6b] Id.-Community and Separate Property-Instructions.An instruction that "Evidence that there was no excess of community incollle over community expenses is as effective to
prove that all asse ts in the name of a decedent are separate
property as a specific showing from which separate source
each asset flowed" lI"as erroneously incomplete where transmutation of separate property into community property by
agreement was in issue.
[7] Id.-Presumption of Payment of Debts Out of Community
Property.-It is presumed that the expenses of the family are
paid from community r:l.ther than separate funds; in the absence of any evidence showing :l. different practice, the community earnings are eh:l.rgeable with these expenses.
[8] Id.-Community and Separate Property-Profits of Business.
-When a husband devotes his services to and invests hi":;
separate property in an economic enterprise, the part of the
profits or increment in value attributable to the husband':;
services must be apportioned to the community.
[9] Id.-Community and Separate Property-Relation of Income
to Living Expenses.-If the amount of profits from a husband's
separate property apportioned to the cOlUlUunity is less than
the amount expcnded for family purposes, and if the presm,lption that family expenses are paid from cOlllmunity funds
applies, all asse t s traceable to the investment are deemed to
be th(> husk,nd's separatc property.
[10] ld.-Community and Separate Property-Relation of Income
to Living Expenses.-"\Yhen a husband purchas es property
durir.g the marriage with funds of an undisclosed or disputed
S0urce, the presump tion that the property is cOll1lllunity m ay
be oyercome by evidence th a t cOlllmunity expenses exceeded
the community income.
[11] Id.-Transacti:ms Inter Se-Changing Character of Property.
- I t is not e s~e ntial for the wi Pe or any lI"itness to show an
expre5S ag ree men t changing the character of the husband's
separate ~"opcrty to C0111lll1mity property; a ch ange in the
[7] See Cal.Jur.2d, Husband and Wife, § 35.
[11] See Cal.Jur.2d, Community Property, §§ 18, 46, 56, 58;
Am.Jur., Husband and Wife, §§ 281, 302.

)

May 1!JG2]

E STATE OF NEILSON
[57 C.2d 733; 22 Cal.Rptr. I . 371 P .2d 745J

735

s tatus of the property may he ~ h o wll by the nature of the
tr:mS:lcti oll (.;. app C:11' f ..alll the surroundin g circull1 stn ncps.
[12] Id.-Community and Separate Property-Inchoate Title Before Maniage C0mp~eted Afterwards.-Where p:!)"ments 011
renl property purchased by one spou se before mnrrin ge were
mnde both before and after the marriage, the community has a
pro tanto interest in th e p r operty in the mti o th at pny ments
on the purchase price with community funds hear to pnyments
made with separate funds. In such a case the property cannot
be considered entirely community by virtue of commingling
of separate and community assets, since the separate and community sources of the property can be traced.
[13] Id.-Transactions Inter Se-Changing Character of Property.
-The fact that a husband and wife filed tax returns splitting
their income before 1948 is substantial evidence that will support a finding of an agree ment to translllute separate to c )mmunity property. The filin g of such r eturns, however, does
not estahlish transmutation as a matter of law.
L14] Id.-Tr:'.Ilsaetions Inter Se-Changing Character of Property.
-Since it is presumed that a per son obeys the law (Code Civ.
Proc., § ID63, subd. 33), alld since a husband and wife could
split their in come for tax purposes prior to 1948 only if it
was community income or each owned half the property, the
filing of tax returns splitting their income prior to that year,
having been signed under the penalty of perjury, created a
disputable presumption that the husband had filed lawful incnme returns and that his separate l;lroperty had heen t"C"8IlSllluted into community property.
[15] Id.-Transactions Inter Se-Changing Character of Property.
-The presumption of trnnslllutntion of separate property into
communi ty, established by the filing of tax returns splitting
the total income of both spouses prior to 1948, can be overcome by evidence that the income splitting represented nothing more than an overzealous desire to minimize income taxes,
such as evidence that the returns were prepared by or on the
ndvice of a tax expert and the spou;;es did not understand
the significance of reporting income in this manner, or testimony or documents indicating that the spouses regarded the
property as separate property despit e the filing of incomesplitting returns.
[16] Id.-Transactions Inter Se-Changing Character of Property.
-The mere fact that a wife joined with her husband in the
execution of deeds and notes would not support a finding
of transmutation of the husband's separate property into
community property, especially where there was testimony of
a bank offic'er that he had the wife sign the notes because he
noticed that the hushand's hC:1lth was failing and testimony
. of n title insurance company 's officer that it was the policy of

736

ESTATE OF NEILSON

[57 C.2d

the company to require a wife to join in the execution of
a deed even when title to the property is vested in the husband. The jury could, however, consider such documents as
evidence supporting the presumption that, by filing incomt'splitting tax returns prior to 1948, the husband had converted
his separate property into community property.
[17] Evidence - Admissions - Of Persons Other Than· party.When a person makes a statement in the presence of a party
to an action under circumstances that would normally call
for a response if the statement were untrue, the statement
is admissible for the limited purpose of showing the party'"
reaction to it. His silence, evasion or equivocation may be considered as a tacit admission of the statements made in his
presence.
[18] Decedents' Estates-Heirship Proceedings-Evidence.-In a
proceeding by children of decedent to determine heirship tl)
property, any admissions the decedent may have made with
regard to the property would be binding on the children as his
successors in interest. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1870, subd. 4.)
[19] ld.-Heirship Proceedings-Evidence.-In a proceeding by
children of decedent to determine heirship to property, decedent's silence at the time of an alleged remark made privately to decedent and the children's stepmother by a bank
officer who had no particular familiarity with the cbaracter
of the property, and which was at most a vague and inconclusive assertion, that some unidentified items were community property could not be interpreted as an adoptive
admission so as to make the bank officer's statement admissible in evidence.
[20] ld.-Rules of Practice.-Not all rules of practice providl'd
by part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure are made applicable
to probate proceedings by Prob. Code, § 1233; such proceedings are to conform only as nearly as is consistently possible
to those for civil actions.
[21] ld.-Heirship Proceedings-Interest.-The fact that Prob.
Code, § 1232, authorizes an award of costs in heirship proceedings, but neither that nor any other section of the code
authorizes an interest award in such proceedings, indicates
that interest is not to be awarded.
[22] ld.-Heirship Proceedings-Nature.-An heirship pro('.eeding
is not an ordinary civil action, but a specialized proceeding
in rem.
[23] ld.-Heirship Proceedings-Purpose.-The sole purpose of an
heirship proceeding is to determine who are the heirs of decedent or entitled to distribution of the estate and to specify
their interests.
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[24] ld.-Heirship Proceedings-Decree.-A decree of heirship in
an heirship proceeding is not in favor of one of the parties
against another.
[25] ld. - Heirship Proceedings - Purpose: Decree.-Prob. CodE',
§§ 1080-1082, relating to heirship proceedings, provide a special
proceeding for the purpose of ascertaining and determining,
in advance of distribution, the persons who have succeeded to
the estate and the portions inherited by or devised to each of
them. No other judgment is to be rendered and no disposition
is to be made of the estate; it is a determination, first, of
the persons entitled as heirs, devisees or legatees, or as their
successors if any have died, and, second, the interest of each
one in the estate of decedent.
[26] ld.-Heirship Proceedings-Interest.-In an heirship proceeding it was error to award the testator's disinherited widow
interest on half the property found to be community property.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County determining heirship. H. L. Chamberlain, Judge.
Reversed.
Cleveland J. Stockton, William C. Coffill, Griffin, Conway
& Jones and Jack R. Jones for Claimants and Appellants.

Robert R. Elledge and Charles M. Samson for Claimant
and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Charles and Ethel Neilson were married
in 1907. A son, Edwin Neilson, and a daughter, Mrs. Hazel
DeBoer, are the sole issue of the marriage. Upon Ethel's death
on May 1, 1939, the assets acquired during the marriage
became the separate property of Charles.
On September 29, 1939, Charles mauied Ines Neilson. She
owned no property at that time and acquired no separate
property thereafter. Charles then owned three parcels of
land, 24, 821 and 1,307 acres respectively, on which he raised
grain. He paid for the 24-acre parcel before the marriage,
but paid approximately $38,500 thereafter on the balance
due for the other two parcels. During the marriage his income
came almost exclusively from the sale of grain from these
parcels and from numerous sales of unimproved realty.
Charles' died testate on May 12, 1958. In his will he
declared that "all of the property which I have is my own
separate property and represents the accumulation of myself
and my former wife, the mother of my two children." The
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will disinherited Ines, devised ccrtain real property to Wade
Coffill in trust for Edwin, and left the residue of the estate
to Hazel. After the will was admitted to probate, Ines elected
to take half the community property existing at the time of
Charles' death (Prob. Code, § 201.)
The executor initiated this heirship proceeding under Probate Code section 1080 to determine the rights of the various
persons claiming an interest in the estate. The sole issue is
how much, if any, of the decedent's estate was community
property.
By stipulation of the parties the court submitted to the
jury a special interrogatory as to the character of each of
the 65 items of real and personal property in the inventory
of the estate. Ines agreed that 16 items of personal property
were decedent 's separate property. The jury returned a sp ecial verdict that these and six other items of personal prop(·rty were decedent's separate property and that the remainder
of the personal property and all of the real property were
community property, except the balance of the purchase price
due on the 1951 sale of the 24-acre parcel, which was found
to be half community prop erty and half decedent's separate
property. Among the items of personal property found to be
community property IS the balance due on three sales of
unimproved realty.
The court entered a decree determining that Ines was
entitled to half the property found to be community property,
with interest thereon . Coffill, Edwin, and Hazel appeal. They
contend that the trial court 's refusal to give two instructions
was prejudicial error, that the decree is not supported by
substantial evidence, and that interest cannot be allowed in
an heirship proceeding.
Th e first proposed instruction, based upon Estate of Pepper,
158 Cal. 619 [112 P . 62, 31 L .R.A. N.S. 1092J , declared:
"If the in come and profits of separate property of a husband
can be accurately identified and segregated, th ey would be his
separate property and not commnnity property. Thus, the
in:,ome and earnings from the farming operations of a hushand conducted by him upon his separate real property constitute his separate property, and are not community property even though he has devoted his personal industry, skill
and att~ntion to the cultivation and care of the farm propcrty." The trial court refused to give this instru ction on the
<:'round that the rule of Estate of Pepper has been "practically
wrpck ed" by snb ~;e ql1l'nt cases.
In the Pepper case the estate consist ed entirely of proceeds

-
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from the sale of deeedent's real property, which had been
used for a nursery business, and the profits and earnings
therefrom. Until he sold the land he devoted his time and
energy to the nursery business. The court held that no apportionment of the nursery profits was required.
In reaching its decision that the entire estate was the
decedent's separate property the court stated: "The appellant
does not dispute the proposition that, if Pepper had, year
after year, sown his land to grai7l, the resulting crops would
have formed a part of his separate estate. But it is argued
that, in the case of the nursery, the principal element in the
success of the venture was the industry, skill, and attention
of Pepper, and that the use of the land was merely incidental
to what was, in effect, a commercial enterprise. We are unable
to see that this argument furnishes a sufficient ground of
distinction. In any agricultural enterprise, the labor and skill
of man are essential to success. An orchard or a grain field
must be cultivated and cared for. The resultant product is
in part due to the processes of nature operating upon the
land, and in part to the intelligent application of manual labor
to the soil. It is, in the nature of things, impossible to apportion the crop so as to determine what share of it has come
from the soil and what share from the exertions of man. The
product must be treated as a whole, and, if it is the growth
of land separately owned, it is the separate property of the
owner of the land. . . . If the crop of grain sown and harvested by the owner of the land constitutes' issues and profits'
of the land, we are unable to see why the same may not be
said of young trees and plants raised on the land until they
are ready for transplanting." (158 Cal. at pp. 623-624.)
(Italics added.)
It is apparent from the language italicized that one of the
grounds of the court's holding was the wife's concession that
the proceeds of a grain crop grown upon the realty of a
husband would be his separate property, regardless of his
efforts in raising the crop. The relevant statutes make no
distinction between agricultural and other enterprises (Civ.
Code, §§ 162, 163), and there were no reported cases that
would warrant such a concession or that would support the
proposition that profits are apportioned between the husband's separate property and the community property only
when the enterprise is "commercial" rather than "agricultural "

)
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[1] In Pereira v. Pereim, 156 Cal. 1, 7 [103 P . 488, 134
Am.St.Rep. 107, 23 L.R.A. N.S. 880], decided one year before
the Pepper case, this court first announced the rule that when
a husband owns a business as his separate property and
devotes his efforts to the enterprise, there must be an apportionment of the profits. [2] The usual method of apportionment is to allocate a fair return on the investment to the
separate property and to allocate any excess to the community
property as arising from the husband's efforts. (Pereira v.
Pereira, supra; Estate of Arstein, 56 Ca1.2d 239, 241 [14 Cal.
Rptr. 809, 364 P.2d 33] ; Randolph v. Randolph, 118 Cal.App.
2d 584, 587 [258 P .2d 547] ; Stice v. Stice, 81 Cal.App.2d 792.
796 [185 P.2d 402].) "Only when the profits and accruals
actually attributable to the separate property are proved to
differ from [the usual interest rate for a well-secured investment] . . . is there reason to depart from this system. "
(Randolph v. Randolph, s1Ipra.) Departures from the Pereira
formula have been made when the husband introduced evidence that "a larger return on his capital had in fact been
realized." (Gilmore v. Gilmm'e, 45 Cal.2d 142, 150 [287 P.2d
769] [great increase in automobile business as a whole accompanied by increase in value of husband's dealer franchises;
husband did not take active part in conducting routine operations of the business] ; Harrold v. Harrold, 43 Ca1.2d 77, 80
[271 P .2d 489] [same]; Huber v. Huber, 27 Cal.2d 784, 792
[167 P .2d 708] [custom broker business required considerable
capital since money was advanced for customers]; Tassi v.
Tassi, 160 Cal.App.2d 680, 691 [325 P.2d 872] [high profits
realized in meat business generally] ; Logan v. Fm'ster, 114
Cal.App.2d 587, 601 [250 P.2d 730] [increase in population
and economic development of community; wife played inactive role in conducting her business] .)
[3] An apportionment of profits is required not only
when the husband conducts a commercial enterprise but also
when he invests separate funds in real estate or securities.
(JIargolis, v. Margolis, 115 Cal.App.2d 131, 135 [251 P .2d
396]; W1:tasch ek v. Witaschck, 56 Cal.App.2d 277, 280-281
[132 P.2d 600].) The proceeds and increment in "alue are
apportioned entirely to the husband's separate estate only
when they are attributable solely to the natural enhancement
of the property (Estate of Cudworth , 133 Cal. 462, 468 [65 P.
1041] ; McDu.ff v. McDuff, 48 Cal.App. 175, 177 [191 P. 957 ] )
or when the husband expended only minimal effort and the
wife introduced no evidencc attributing a value to his services.
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( Cozz i v. Co zzi, 81 Cal.App.2d 229, 232 [183 P.2d 739];
E stat c of Barnes, 128 Cal.App. 489, 492 [17 P.2d 1046].)
[ 4] There is no rea:;on why a grain farmer or nursery

operator who eOllducis his enterprise on separate real property should be exempt ed from the normal apportionment rule
and not be required to ac count to the community for a portion
of the profits. Acc ordingly, the P epp er case has been justly
criticized. ( S ee 1 Armstrong, California F amily Law 480;
4 "\Yitkin , Summary of California Law [7th ed.] 2725] ; Continuing Education of the Bar, Family Law for California
Lawyers, 368-369; Evans, Primary Sourc es of Acqllisition of
Community Prop el'fy, 10 Cal.L.Rev. 271, 284; ct. 14 Cal.L.
Rev. 402, 404-405.)
The Pepper holding was based not only on the erroneous
concession of counsel, but also on the ground that it is "impossible to apportion the crop so as to determine what share
of it has come from the soil and what share from the exertions
of man. " (158 Cal. at p. 624.) Although it may be difficult
to make an apportionment, it is "impossible" only in the
sense that it cannot be mathematically certain. (See J enkl:ns
v. J enkins, llO Cal.App.2d 663, 666 [243 P.2d 79], where
5/ 14 of 28 head of cattle bought with the husband's separate
property were apportioned to the community.) The long
line of cases starting with Percl:ra dispels any notion that
such impossibility justifies a finding that none of the proceeds
belongs to the community. These cases have established the
rule that when part of the proceeds from a separate property
enterprise or im'estment arise from the husband's efforts,
there must be an apportionm ent. E stat e 0/ P epp er, Sllpra,
158 Cal. 619, is therefore overruled. [5] The first proposed
instrnction was properly rcfu'>ed, for it erroneously declared
that even though a husband devoted his efforts to farming
operations all of the income and earnings therefrom would
be his separate property.
[6a] The second proposed in struction declared: "Evidence that there was no excess of community income over
community expenses is as effective to prove that all assets in
the name of a decedent are separate property as a specific
showing from which separate source each asset fiowed." The
proposed instruction is base(l npon a statement in Estate of
Ades, 81 Cal.App.2cl 334, 339 [18'1 P.2d 1], which was quoted
with approval in Estate 0/ Arstein, 56 Cal.2d 239, 242 [14
Cal.Rptr. 809, 364 P.2d 33]. This statement was properly
invoked in those cases, for transmutation of separate property
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into community propcrty by agrec ment was 1I0t in is.~uc . Au
instruction bascd on that StatcIllcnt would be enoneou.;ly incomplete, howev er, whrll, as ill the prcsent casc, sueh trans·
mutation is in issue.
[7] It is presllmed tha t t hc expellSCS of the f ,1mily are
paid fro111 commu nity rather thau scpar;lt :~ funds. ( H 'ub er
v. Hub er, 27 Ca1.2d 784, 792 [167 P.2d 708] .) Thus, in the
absence of any evidence shO\ving a llifi'er cut practice the community earnings arc chargeable with these expenses. (Title
Ins. & Trust Ca. v. Il1 gersoll, 158 Cal. 474, 402 [111 P. 360].)
[8] When a husband devotcs his scrvices to and invests
his separate property in an economic enterprise, the part
of the profits or increment in value attributable to the husband's services must be apportioned to the community. [9] If
the amount apportioned to the commnnity is less than the
amount expend ed for family purposes and if the presumption
t hat family expenses are paid from communi ty funds applies,
all assets traceable to the inv e ~ tmellt arc d eem ed to be the
husband's separate property. ( Estat e of Adcs, supra, 81
Cz.l.App.2d at p. 338; Estat c of Arstein, supra. 56 Ca1.2d at
p. 241; Logan v. Forst er, 114 Cal.App.2d 587, 601-602 [250
P.2d 730] ; Cozzi V. COZZ1', 81 Cal.App.2d 229, 232·233 [183
P.2d 739].) [10] Similarly, when a husband purchases
property during the marriage with funds of an undisclosed
or disputed source, the presumpt ion that the property is community may be overcome by evidence that community ex·
penses exceeded the community income. In sucll a case, the
husband traces the source of the disputed property to his
separate prop erty by a process of elimination: since all the
community illC'ome was exhausted b:v family expenses the
property must have been purchased with his separate funds.
( Kenn cy v. K enney, 128 Cal.App.2d 128, 136 [274 P .2d 951] ;
Th omass et v. Thoma sset, 122 Cal.App .2d 116, 126-127 [264
P .2d 626].)
[6b] In either of these hyo types of cases, the instruction
proposed by appellants would accurately state the law only if
the wife did not introduce evidence that the husband's separate propert.y was transmuted into community property. If
the jury found that there was such an agreement, an exces~
of community expenses over community income could not
prove that assets in the husband's name were his separate
property. Thus, within the context of this case, the proposed
instruction was inaccurate and was properly refused. 11ore-
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over, the jury was correctly informed of the nature and effect
of the presumption in another instruction 1 given to the jury.
Appellants' basic contention is that there is no substantial
evidence to support the special verdict. [11] Since neither
Ines nor any other witness testified that there was a written
or oral agrcemen t changing the character of her hlL':;band's
separate property (see Woods Y. Secu.rity-Fil·st Nat. Bank,
46 Ca1.2J 697, 701 [299 P.2d 657] ; Kenn ey Y. Kenney, 220
Cal. 134, 136 [30 P.2d 398]), she is compelled to rely upon
the rule first stated. in Title Insurancc &- Trust CO. Y. Ingersoll,
153 Cal. 1, 5 [94 P. 94] : "it is not essential in such a case for
the husband to show any express agreement on the part of the
wife. The gift or change in the status of the property may
be shown by the very nature of the transaction or appeal'
from the surrounding circumstances. "
(See also Long ......
Long, 88 Cal.App.2d 544, 5-±9 [199 P.2d 47] .)
Although there is suustantial evidence in the record that
would support a finding of transmetat ion, it is apparent from
the special verdict that the jury based its verdict not on
transmutation, but on a faulty understanding of the instructions relating to commingling of community and separate
property.
The jury found the 1,307 and 821-acre parcels and all assets
traceable to them to be commuuity property. Payments on
the purchase price of each of these parcels were made before
and after Charles' marriage to Ines and many improvements
were made thereon after the marriage. The jury, however,
found the purchase price due Charles on the 1951 sale of the
24-acre parcel to be half separate and half community property. Although improvements "ere also made on this parcel
after the marriage, Charles had paid the entire purchase
price for it before the marriage. Since there is no evidence
that there "as a transmutation of the first two parcels but not
of the third, the jury must have interpreted the iustructions
to mean that land is entirely community if commnnity funds
are used. to pay a part of th e purchase pri ce regardless of
the fact that snb"t:mtial separate property funds "ere also
1 " It is presumed tha.t nil liying expenses during marriage are paid
from commurl:ity income. if any exists. If you f.nn. that any of the
income rec eived from any sourcp. either by Cltnrles Christian Neilson or
hy Ines N eilson during their marria ge was community property and
that all living expens es were paid from community Innds, then you must
subtract from such commnnity income all family liying expenses of the
Neilson family during the marriage, and only the balance remaining,
if any, would ha"e the status of community property."
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used. [12] Such an interpretation is erroneous, for "the
rule developed through the decisions in California gives to
the community a pro tanto community property interest in
such property in the ratio that the payments on the purchase
price with community funds bear to the payments made with
separate funds." (Forbes v. Fm'bes, 118 Cal.App.2d 324,
325 [257 P.2d 721]; Garten v. Garten, 140 Cal.App.2d 489,
494 [295 P.2d 23] ; Estate of Fellou~s, 106 Cal.App. 681, 683
[289 P. 887].) In such cases, the property cannot be considered entirely community by virtue of commingling of
separate and community assets, for the separate and community sources of the property can be traced. (Fountain v.
Maxim, 210 Cal. 48, 51 [290 P. 576] ; Thomassct v. Thomasset,
122 Cal.App.2d 116,124 [264 P.2d 626].) Upon the evidence
before it, the jury had no choice but to find that all three
parcels of land had or had not been transmuted to community
property, and if not to apportion the property according to
the extent that separate and community funds contributed to
the various purchase prices and improvements.
Because of this inconsistency in the jury's verdict the decree must be reversed. To aid the trial court on the retrial
of this case, however, we shall consider the evidence that
Ines contends would support an inference that there was an
agreement of transmutation and also appellants' contention
that interest cannot be awarded in an heirship proceeding.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 53.)
Ines testified that Charles filed joint income tax returns
each year of their marriage except 1946 when individual returns were filed. The 1946 returns also split the total income
of both spouses. [13] The fact that a husband and wife
filed tax returns splitting their income before 1948 2 is substantial evidence that will support a finding of transmutation.
(Heck v. Heck, 63 Cal.App.2d 470, 475 [147 P.2d 110];
'Joint returns filed in 1948 and subsequent years are no evidence of
transmutation. Since that year husbands and wives in all states have
been permitted to file joint returns and split their income whether the
income reported is separate or community. (Revenue Act of 1948, ~~ 301,
303, 6:l Stat. 114, 11 5, 26 U.S.C.A . ~~ 2, 6013; see also Hofferbert v.
JIarsllall (4 Cir. 1952) 200 F.2d 648, 650-651.) Before 1948, spouses
living in community property states could split their community income
if the wife had a present, existing. and equal interest in the community
property: (Poe Y. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 111 [51 S.Ct. 58, 75 L.Ed.
~39l; Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. 118 [51 S.Ct. 62, 75 L .Ed. 247];
Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122 [.~1 S.Ct. 62, 75 L.Ed. 249]; BeniJer v.
Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127 ['11 S.Ct. 64, 75 L.Ed. 252]; United State8 V.
Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792 [;;1 S.Ct. 184, 75 L.Ed. 714].)
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Estate of Ra.phael, 91 Cal.App.2d 931, 939 [206 P.2d 391] ;
see also Lawateh v. Lawateh, 161 Cal.App.2d 780, 790 [327
P.2d 603] ; Estate of Cumm·ins, 130 Cal.App.2d 821, 82!J [280
P.2d 128]; Handley v. Handley, 113 Cal.App.2d 280, 284
[248 P.2d 59].) The filing of such r eturns, however, does not
establish transmutation as a matter of law. (Bal'k er v. Barker,
139 Cal.App.2d 206, 212-213 [293 P.2d 85]; K enn ey v.
H enn ey, 128 Cal.App.2d128, 135 [274 P.2d 951].)
[14] It is presumed that a person obeys the law. (Code
Civ. Proe., § 1963, subd. 33; Groves v. City of Los Angeles,
40 Cal.2d 751, 757 [256 P.2d 309] ; Gould v. StafJord, 91 Cal.
146, 153 [27 P. 543].) Charles and Ines could split their
income for tax purposes prior to 1948 only if it was community income or each owned half the property. Their returns
were signed under the penalty of perjury and created a disputable presumption that Charles had filed lawful income
returns and that his separate property had therefore been
transmuted into community property. (See Harlow v. United
Title Guaranty Co ., 145 Cal.App.2d 672, 675 [303 P.2d 16].)
[ 15 ] This presumption can be overcome by evidence that
the income splitting represented nothing more than an "overzealous desire to minimize income taxes." (See Marsh, California Family Law-A Review, 42 Cal. L. Rev. 368, 373.)
Such evidence might consist of testimony that the returns were
prepared by or upon the advice of a tax expert and the
spouses did not nnderstand the significance of reporting income in this manner (Hopkins v. Detrick, 97 Cal.App.2d 50,
56 [217 P.2d 78] ; Balk ema v. Deiches, 90 Cal.App.2d 427,430431 [202 P.2d 1068]), or of testimony or documents indicating
that the spouses regarded the property as separate property
despite the filing of income-splitting returns.
In three sales of property that Charles owned at the time
of the marriage, the deeds contained Charles' and Ines' signatures and the granting clauses stated that both were the
grantors. Two of these deeds were executed in 1955, the other
in 1956. The granting clauses of at least four other deeds
executed between 1946 and 1956, however, described Charler;
as "dealing with his sole and separate property," and as the
grantor. Moreover, an officer of the title insurance company,
upon whose forms the deeds containing Ines' name and signature were executed, testified that it was the policy of his
company and the lending institution that financed the transactions to require a wife to join in the execution of a deed
even when title to the property is vested in her husband. He
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testified [urthet' that the policy of his company did not purport to reflect the charade . : of the property being' conveyed.
Ines also exet:uted five joiJlt alld several notes with her
husband. All of these llote ~ w"re exe(:uted wi thin a fiVe-iEO Jlth
period in 1956. The officer of the bank ,,,ho negotiated tllCse
loaus testified that he had Ines sigu tile uotes because" in 1 UiJ6
I noticed that Mr. Nielson's health was failing and so I figured
the bauk ,,"ould be in a better positiou to haye both parties on
thc Note in ca~e something' ~ho uld happen to Mr. Nielson."
'1'his testimony also explains the addition of Ines' name to
Charles' open-note accollnt with the bank in 1956.
[16] Under these circ;ul1ls tauces, the fact that Ines jOil;',U
in the execution of three deeds and five 11otes, taken alone,
would not be sufficient to sustain a finding' of transmutation.
(See Wedem r yer v. Elm er, 33 Cal.App.2c1 336, 3:39 [91 P.2d
642] ; Madin v. Martin, iJ2 Cal. 235, 237; Oldci'sllaw v. Matte son ((; WmiamsoH Jijg. Cu., 19 Cal.App. 179, 183 [125 P. 263] ;
Diefe ndorf] v. Hop kins, 95 Cal. 343, 351 [28 P. 365, 30 P.
549] ; Kenney v. Kenn ey, 128 Cal.App.2d 128, 138 [274 P.2d
9.51].) The jury could, however, consider these documents
as evidence supporting the presumption that by filing the
income-splitting tax returns Charles had converted his separate property into community property.
Ines testified that when she signed the first joint note the
bank officer said in substance "that it was our property, and
- our community property, and he ,,"ould like my signature,
with my husband's on the note." She also t estified that
Charles was present at the time and said nothing to the
contrary. The bank officer testified that he could not remember making such a statement and that he requested Ines' signature on the note because of Charles' fuiling' health.
[17] When a person makes a statement in the presence
of a party to an action under circumstances that "ould
normally call for a response if the statemcnt " ere untrue, the
statement io;; admissible for t he limited pmpose of sho\'\ing the
party's reaction to it. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1870, subd. 3;
A.. dkills v. Brett, 184 Cal. 252, 255 [193 P. 251] ; People v.
SimlJ!ons, 28 Ca1.2d 699, 71:2-713 [172 P.2J 18].) His silence,
eyasion, or equiyocation may be cO;ls; llerec1 ail a tacit adm ission
of the statements made in his pre:;ence. (Es tate of S1101;;ball,
1.57 Cal. 301, 311 [107 P . 598] ; Iibbct v. Sue, 125 Cal. 544,
546 [58 P. 160].) [18] Althong'~l Charles was not a party
to this act!o!!, any o.clrnissiolls he rna:\' have made with regard
to the character of the prolwri:v \. . on1 (1 be binding upon appel-.
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lants as his succ:e3sors in interest. (Code Ciy. Proc., § 1870,
subd. 4; E state of lIill, 167 C~d. 50, 6:; [138 P. 600] ; Inucrsoll
v. Tnl cbody, 40 Cal. 603, 613.) [19] Admissibility of this evidence dep ends upon whether the bauk officer made the allcged statcment under cir cumstances that called for a reply,
whether Charles under stood the statement, and 'rh ethcr it could
lje inferred irom his conduct that he adopted thc statrp,ent as
an admissioll. (People Y. Pnrvl:s, 36 Ca1.2cl03, 97 [13 C:!l .Rptr.
801, 362 P.2d 713] ; People v. S:mmons, supra; Southers v.
Savage, 191 Cal.App.2d 100, 104-103 [12 Cal.Rptr. 470.) The
bank officer did not make the alleged statement under circumstances that would ordinarily evoke a response. This is not a
case where a person was silent iu the facc of an accusation of a
crime, negligence, or other wl·ongdoing. (See Kell er v. Key
System Tl'allsit L ines, 120 Cal.App.2d 593, 596 [277 P.2d
860].) The alleged remark, mal~e privately to Charles and
Ines by a person ,,-110 apparently had no particular familiarity
with the character of their property, was at most a vague and
incollclusive assertion that some unidentified items "'ere COIll J",lUnity property. (Compare the explicit statement made in
the husband's presence by his attorney in Lalcatch v. Lalcat ch ,
IGI Cal.App.2d 780, 790 [327 P.2cl 603].) Under these circumstances, Charles' silence cannot be interpreted as an adoptiyc admission. (Perkins v. West, 122 Cal.App.2d 585, 391
[ ~6;) P.2d 538] ; Henders on v. Nodhlzal1l, 176 Cal. 493, 497
l lGB P. 1044] ; Wilkins v. StidO C1', 22 Cal. 231, 230 [83 ~\.lll.
Dec. 64].)
lYe agree ,,"ith appellants that the trial court errl' d in
awarding interest to 111es. [20] Probate Code section 1233
proyides : "Except as otherwise provided by this code or by
rules adopted by the Judicial Council, the provisions of Part 2
of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to and constitute the rnles of practice in the proceedings mentioned in
this code with r egard to b'ids. new trials, appeals, and all
other matters of procedure." Thus, Code of Civil Procedure
section 58], providing ",-hen an action may be dismissed
(O'Day Y. Sup uio r COllrt, 18 Ca1.2d 540, 542-543 [116 P .2d
621] ), section 583, pro-..-ic1ing for dismissal for want of prosecution (Est'1f~ of J10]';'is01l, 125 Cal.App. 504, 509 [14 P .2(1
102] ), and Settioll 387, providin~ for intervention by interested persons ( YIJ ~fC C Y . Superior C Ollrt, 20 Ca1.2d 479, 485
[127 P.2d 536] ) Ul)ply to procee c1ings in probate. Not all of
the proyisiollS of part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure apply
to probatc proceedillgs, hon-ever. Such proceedings are to
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conform only "as nearly as is consistently posStDle, to those
for civil actions." (0 'Day v. Superior Cmirt, supra, 18 Cal.2d
at p. 543.) (Italics added.) (See also Horney v. Sup erior
C01irt, 83 Cal.App.2d 262, 267 [188 P.2d 552]. )
Code of Civil Procedure section 1033 provides in part that
"[t]he clerk or judge must include in the judgment entered
up by him, any interest on the verdict or decision of the court,
from the time it was rendered or made, and the costs, if the
same have been taxed or ascertained." Ines contends that this
section is incorporated into the Probate Code through section
1233 of that code and applies to heirship decrees. [21] Probate Code section 1232, however, authorizes an award of costs
in heirship proceedings, but neither that nor any other section
of the Probate Code specifically authorizes an interest award
in such proceedings. The fact that provision is made for costs
but not for interest indicates that interest is not to be
awarded. Moreover, Code of Civil Procedure section 1033 is
included in part 2, title 14, chapter 6, which deals almost
exclusively with the awarding of costs in civil actions. Had
the Legislature meant to authorize interest awards in heirship
proceedings it would have specifically so provided in the
Probate Code as it did for costs or would have made no provision for costs in that code. [22] Furthermore, an heirship
proceeding is not an ordinary civil action, but a specialized
proceeding in rem. (Estate of Wise, 34 Cal.2d 376, 383 [210
P.2d 497].) [2 3 ] The sole purpose of such a proceeding is
to "determine who are the heirs of the decedent or entitled to
distribution of the estate and [to] . . . specify their interests." (Prob. Code, § 1081.) [24] The decree is not
in favor of one of the parties against another. (Estate of
Wise, supra, 34 Ca1.2d at p . 385; Estate of Radovich, 48 Cal.2d
116, 120 [308 P.2d 14] .) [25] As was stated in Whalen
v. Smith, 163 Cal. 360, 364 [124 P . 904, Ann. Cas. 1913E
1319]: "This section [predecessor of Prob. Code, §§ 10801082] provides a special proceeding for the purpose of ascertaining and determining, in advance of distribution, the persons who have succeeded to the estate and the portions inherited by or devised to each of them .. . . No other judgment
is to be rendered and no disposition whatever is to be made
of the e'ttate. It is a determination, first, of the persons
entitled as heirs, devisees, or legatees, or as their successors,
if any have died; and, second. the interest of each one in
the estate of the decedent." [26] In view of the limited
purpose of an heirship proceeding and the fact that interest
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is ordiuarily awarued only on a money judgment (Sullivan
v. Wellborn, 32 Ca1.2d 214, 219 [195 P.2d 787]) the court
erroneously awarded Ines interest on half the property found
to be community property.
The decree is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J.,
and Dooling, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied June 20,
1962.

